We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital inflows to identify overvalued equity. This is a relatively exogenous overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying -buyers with excess liquidity -rather than what is being purchased. We document substantial stock price impact associated with purchases by high-inflow mutual funds, and find the probability of an SEO, insider sales, and the probability of a stock-based acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund buying pressure. These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvalued equity.
1 Seasoned equity offerings have been widely studied in the literature, with little emerging consensus on their determinants and economic consequences. Proposed determinants of SEOs include capital investments, refinancing, liquidity squeezes, corporate control, stock market microstructure and timing by managers with private information that their stock is overvalued (Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) , Graham and Harvey (2001) , Baker and Wurgler (2002) ). In this paper we propose a novel approach to testing the market-timing motive for SEOs, and provide evidence of SEO timing.
The main empirical challenge in tests of SEO timing is identifying overvalued firms.
Prior studies examining market timing have typically used high market-to-book ratios or high past returns as identifiers of overvaluation. However, these studies "continue to be hotly debated" (Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) ) because, as described in detail in the next section, traditional indicators of overvaluation are correlated with other determinants of SEOs. We respond to this debate in the literature by identifying a setting where overvaluation is relatively exogenous to the firm. In particular, we identify overvalued stocks as those subject to substantial buying pressure by mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to widespread buying pressure by other mutual funds, and refer to these as stocks subject to Inflowdriven Buying Pressure (IBP). In this setting, the overvaluation is associated with who is buying -mutual funds with excess liquidity -rather than by what is being purchased.
Mutual funds with large capital inflows are eager to invest the cash since stockpiling cash makes it difficult for them to outperform their benchmarks (Coval and Stafford (2007) ) and since they may be precluded by their investment mandate from holding large cash balances. This excess liquidity is channeled into a narrow set of stocks since mutual funds follow specialized investment strategies (i.e., they face restricted investment opportunity sets or IOS), and since they likely face diminishing marginal investment prospects. Consistent with restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects, we document that the average number of stocks held by mutual funds in the top capital flow decile is 107, which is a small fraction of the universe of Funds with higher inflows have about the same proportion of newly initiated holdings as other funds. This is in contrast to a positive relation between fund flows and initiations that would be expected if fund IOS and investment prospects were unrestricted.
We expect inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure to result in upward stock price pressure, if individual stocks have downward sloping demand curves. To identify overvaluation associated with mutual fund inflow-driven buying pressure rather than with fundamental information about the firms, we require IBP stocks to meet two ex ante conditions: (i) they are subject to buying pressure by mutual funds in the top flow decile; and (ii) they are not subject to buying pressure by mutual funds in other flow deciles. Using these criteria we identify about 1.5% of all mutual fund trades as IBP. We then document that IBP stocks have average prior year returns of 49%, and experience a cumulative decline in market-adjusted returns of 10% over the six quarters subsequent to the buying pressure quarter, consistent with overvaluation due to inflow-driven buying pressure. In contrast, stocks subject to widespread buying pressure by mutual funds other than those in the top decile of capital flows (WBP stocks) have average prior year returns of 32%, and experience a cumulative decline in market-adjusted returns of 2.8% over the subsequent six quarters, consistent with widespread buying being driven more by firmspecific information.
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Identifying equity with pronounced and sustained overvaluation (IBP stocks) is a precondition to our main objective, testing the SEO timing theory. If managers privately identify overvaluation and time SEOs to exploit the overvaluation, we expect IBP-affected firms to exhibit a higher likelihood of SEOs relative to all firms that are not overvalued. We find 172
SEOs associated with IBP stocks, collectively accounting for $23b of new equity. This represents 5.2% by number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs in our sample. We test the timing hypothesis by estimating a Logit model of SEO choice that controls for a number of determinants of SEOs, including prior returns and the market-to-book ratio. In addition, we construct a number of matched samples in which we first match IBP firms to other firms on selected firm characteristics, and then compare SEO probabilities in the 'treatment' and 'control' samples in the four quarters following IBP. In all tests, the probability of an SEO following IBP stock-quarters is significantly higher, ranging from 30% to 84% higher probability. This suggests firm managers identify overvaluation and time SEOs.
The large abnormal return reversion of IBP stocks after buying pressure is not consistent with alternative explanations that inflow-driven buying is informed, or that highinflow fund managers are smart stock pickers.
To corroborate the evidence on SEO timing we test two other predictions. First, if IBP firms are overvalued we expect an increase in insider sales. We therefore test for increased insider sales in the four quarters following IBP. We estimate a multiple regression model of insider sales (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman (1998) , Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), Jenter (2005) ), and also test for differences in mean insider sales in matched samples. In all tests, we find significantly higher insider sales in the four quarters following IBP, ranging from 5.3% to 9.3% higher sales ratios. An increase in insider sales of IBP stocks is not consistent with alternative explanations that inflow-driven mutual fund purchases are informed. However, it is consistent with our hypothesis that excess fund liquidity, combined with funds' restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects, is associated with some overvalued purchases.
Second, if IBP firms are overvalued we expect them to exhibit a higher likelihood of stock-based acquisitions in the four quarters following IBP. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Jensen (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) suggest overvaluation is associated with stock-based acquisitions, and increases the probability of deal initiation or of completion of previously initiated deals. We find 268 acquisitions associated with IBP stocks, collectively accounting for $309b of transactions. This represents 3.9% by number, and 9% by dollar value, of all acquisitions in our sample. We test the timing prediction by estimating a Logit model as well as conducting tests of differences in acquisition frequency in matched samples. In most tests of M&A probability in the four quarters following IBP, we find the probability of an acquisition is significantly higher, ranging from 19% to 35% higher probability.
Our findings collectively support the hypothesis that managers exploit "windows of opportunity" (Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) ) presented by overpricing of their firms' equity to time the market. Our findings are also consistent with a broad class of models in which capital markets are imperfect but managers are able to identify price dislocations (see Baker et al. (2007) for a review). The equity market timing theory has implications for external financing choice, for the firm's capital structure if the impact of timing is persistent, for corporate governance in terms of allowing managers discretion to exploit or ignore market price signals that differ from their private assessment of value, and for understanding determinants of insider trading.
Finally, we note as a caveat that we establish an association, rather than a causal relation, between buying pressure and overvaluation. As we note above, the causal interpretation is consistent with our collective empirical evidence, but without a rigorous proof of causality we cannot rule out potential alternative explanations for the association.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I briefly describes our setting and reviews the prior literature on SEO timing and price pressure. Section II describes the identification of overvalued stocks as a result of inflow-driven buying pressure by mutual funds.
Section III describes tests of SEO timing, insider sale timing and M&A timing. Section IV discusses a number of sensitivity tests. Section V concludes with a summary, discussion of some implications of our findings and suggestions for future research.
I. The Setting
A number of papers have examined whether managers time the market when issuing equity. The main empirical challenge is to identify mispriced stocks, and prior authors have used ex ante and ex post methods to infer mispricing (Baker et al. (2007) ).
Ex ante methods include using a measure of fundamental value scaled by market value such as the market-to-book ratio, or using prior returns, to identify overvalued stocks. As emphasized in Baker et al. (2007) , both measures are difficult to interpret. For example, measuring fundamental value is difficult since accounting book values are based on historical costs and subject to discretionary managerial accounting choices. Further, the market-to-book ratio is correlated with many firm characteristics that may drive financing policy, so high market-to-book ratios do not necessarily indicate overvaluation that can be exploited by market timers. Prior returns as a measure of mispricing face similar difficulties in interpretation. Firms with high prior returns may have discovered valuable growth opportunities and harvesting these opportunities, rather than market timing, could drive the issuance decision.
Ex post methods rely on reversion in future abnormal returns to infer overvaluation. For example, tests of long-horizon stock return performance following SEOs find underperformance, suggesting that issuance occurred when the stock was overpriced. One challenge to this interpretation is that risk changes may be associated with SEOs. For example, Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) suggest that equity issuance lowers leverage and therefore systematic risk, leading to lower future returns.
In this paper we use ex ante information to identify overvalued stocks, but our identifier is an event rather than a firm characteristic. In particular, the event is large uninformed buying pressure by mutual funds with large capital inflows. We document that this event is associated with large abnormal returns and subsequent return reversion, and argue that this event is likely exogenous to the firm since it is associated with who is buying -buyers with excess liquidityrather than with what is being bought. We discuss our identification method in detail in the next section.
Prior empirical evidence of short-lived price pressure in equity markets is presented in Kraus and Stoll (1972) , Harris and Gurel (1986) , Shleifer (1986) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) , and evidence of slightly longer-lived price pressure of a few weeks is presented in Greenwood (2005) . However, relatively short-lived price pressure precludes testing the equity market timing theory. Evidence of price pressure due to flow-driven mutual fund trading, with prices persistently reverting over a few quarters, is presented in Coval and Stafford (CS, 2007) , but our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our objective is to test the equity market timing theory, while CS do not test the timing theory; (ii) our focus is on inflow-driven buying and we offer a story for the resulting price pressure, while CS focus on and offer a story for outflowdriven firesales; and (iii) our mispricing identifier differs in that our mispricing candidates are stocks subject to buying pressure by funds in the top flow decile (first condition) but not subject to buying pressure by other funds (second condition). The mispricing identifier in CS imposes our first, but not our second, condition. Consistent with our results, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment, and find that high sentiment (or dumb money) predicts low future returns. They also report that high sentiment is associated with increases in shares outstanding in the next three years. Our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our focus is on the timing of SEOs and we provide extensive tests of the SEO timing hypothesis; (ii) we show that insider sales are timed to exploit overvaluation; (iii) we show that stock-based acquisitions are timed to exploit overvaluation; and (iv) we show that managers respond to overvaluation in a more timely manner, within four quarters of being affected by IBP.
Our paper is also related to Chen et al. (2007) who examine whether hedge funds exploit mutual fund trading pressure through front-running. We examine whether a different group of market participants, firm managers, exploit IBP through SEOs, insider sales and M&A.
Consistent with Chen et al. (2007) , our results suggest that "sophisticated" market participants are able to identify this particular source of mispricing (price pressure due to inflow-driven mutual fund purchases), 2 although our data allows us to provide more direct evidence since we are able to match SEOs, insider sales and M&A to IBP-affected stocks.
II. Mutual Fund Trading Pressure and Stock Price Impact
Mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows face the unique challenge of excess liquidity: quickly finding productive opportunities for the new capital. Stockpiling cash is likely against their charter, and is also likely to increase tracking error with respect to their all-equity benchmarks. Since funds follow specialized investment strategies we do not expect the excess cash to be invested widely in the universe of stocks. Rather, funds' restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects are likely to result in the excess cash being channeled into a narrow set of stocks and creating buying pressure in some stocks. We expect the buying pressure by such funds to dislocate prices of the stocks they choose to buy (e.g., Coval and
Stafford (2007)).
For each stock held by mutual funds, we form a measure of trading pressure as follows.
First, we define mutual fund flows as:
where TA is total net assets of mutual fund j in month s, and R is the monthly return for fund j in month s. We sum the monthly flows each quarter to obtain the quarterly flow, flow j,t , of mutual fund j in quarter t. Monthly total net assets and returns of mutual funds are obtained from CRSP, Table I shows quarterly flows, prior-year returns, the total number of holdings, and the percent of holdings that were expanded or initiated, by mutual fund flow decile, for 63,426 fundquarters from 1990 to 2007. Table I shows a large spread in flows, ranging from 40.3% for the top decile to -17% for the bottom decile. Prior-year fund returns decrease monotonically from 16.6% for the top decile to 6.1% for the bottom decile. This confirms evidence in the prior literature that (a) fund flows vary monotonically with past fund performance, and (b) the flowperformance relation is asymmetric in that inflows due to good past performance are much larger in magnitude than outflows due to poor past performance (Ippolito (1992) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) ). Table I We calculate trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as:
where i indexes the stock, j indexes the mutual fund and t indexes the calendar quarter. This measure is similar to those used in Coval and Stafford (2007) and Chen et al. (2007) . 3 To distinguish flow-motivated trading from potentially information-motivated trading, we calculate unforced pressure for stock i in quarter t as:
Intuitively, trading pressure is interpreted as buying pressure when funds with large inflows (top decile of flow in quarter t) are net buyers of the stock, and as selling pressure when funds with large outflows (bottom decile of flow in quarter t) are net sellers of the stock. In a sense,
Pressure is a measure of excess demand from mutual funds with large capital flows. 
This variable captures net trading activity in a stock by mutual funds in the middle eight deciles of flows, or widespread net trading. Information-driven purchases are identified as stocks in the top decile of UPressure. UPressure is similar to measures used in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999) to identify mutual fund demand imbalances.
We sort stock-quarters into deciles of Pressure and UPressure, and identify IBP stocks as those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles (deciles four, five and six) of
UPressure. 4 In other words, IBP stocks are those that are subject to large buying pressure by mutual funds with extreme inflows, but that are not subject to widespread net trading pressure by other mutual funds. IBP stocks are our overvaluation candidates. To examine whether the overvaluation of IBP stocks is driven by inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure, rather than by mutual fund buying pressure generally, we contrast the abnormal return pattern of IBP stocks with those of stocks in the top decile of UPressure. We refer to stocks in the top decile of UPressure as WBP (Widespread Buying Pressure) stocks.
[ Panel A of Table III shows quarterly mean abnormal returns from quarters t−4 to t+6 for stocks subject to mutual fund buying pressure in quarter t=0 (Pressure is calculated in quarter t=0). Abnormal returns are industry-adjusted returns, using the Fama-French equal-weighted 48 industry portfolios. We calculate mean abnormal returns each quarter for the portfolio of IBP and WBP stocks, and use the time series of portfolio abnormal returns for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional correlation (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973) , Coval and Stafford (2007) stocks, is consistent with inflow-driven buying pressure resulting in overvaluation, and widespread mutual fund buying being associated with favorable firm-specific information.
[FIGURE 1 HERE] Figure 1 shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for IBP and WBP stocks.
We sum average abnormal returns over consecutive quarters to obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns shown in Figure 1 . The CAAR patterns in Figure 1 suggest that flow-driven mutual fund purchases result in substantial overvaluation, or a shift in the demand curve for a stock. In contrast, widespread buying by mutual funds (non-inflow-driven purchases) does not seem to result in overvaluation.
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III. Main Tests
Using the IBP stocks identified as overvalued in the previous section, we now turn to our main objective, testing the theory that firms exploit "windows of opportunity" to time SEOs (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) , Graham and Harvey (2001) , Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
Section A presents tests of SEO timing. To corroborate the inference from Section A, we also test whether insider sales are timed (Section B) and whether stock-based corporate acquisitions are timed (Section C).
A. Timing of SEOs
We test whether firms identify and exploit the overvaluation associated with mutual fund flow-driven buying pressure by issuing seasoned equity within four quarters of the stock being subject to IBP. We do not examine SEOs contemporaneous with buying pressure to avoid confounding inferences through any reverse causality (i.e., that mutual funds may be buying because firms are issuing equity, rather than the reverse, which is our hypothesis). The prior evidence in the literature suggests a four-quarter managerial response window allows sufficient time for firms to go to market once they decide to have an SEO. Before the offering, firms have to register securities with the SEC and may also undertake marketing efforts to discover or create 6 Results are robust to using a two-quarter managerial response window as reported in the internet appendix.
demand. Registration can be 'traditional,' in which case firms register each offering immediately prior to the offering, or 'shelf,' in which case firms pre-register future potential offerings up to two years in advance and simply take-down these pre-approved offerings as they go to market. Shelf registrations have much lower registration times. Marketing activities can be full or accelerated, depending on the time taken for demand discovery by sellers and due diligence by potential buyers, and take about two weeks for full marketing and as little as a day for accelerated marketing. Overall, including both registration and marketing times, the average time between the SEC filing date and the offering date for SEOs is about 30 business days (e.g., Gao and Ritter (2010) ).
We test our hypothesis of SEO timing by estimating a Logit regression of the issuance decision in quarter t, including an indicator dummy for stock-quarters with IBP in any of the four quarters from t-4 through t-1, which allows a managerial response window of four quarters.
Linear regressions of SEO choice on determinants have been estimated in, for example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) .
Following the prior literature (e.g., Eckbo et al. (2000)), we obtain SEO data from the SDC database. After retaining only common stock issuances that trade on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, and excluding investment trusts (e.g., REIT's), American Depositary Receipts, utilities (SIC codes 4910-4939) and secondary offerings in which no new shares are issued, we are left with 3307 SEOs between 1990 and 2007 that have all the required data for our tests. We exclude utilities since the duration of the regulatory approval process limits the ability of utilities to time SEOs in response to temporary overpricing (Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). There are 172
SEOs of IBP stocks in the four quarters following IBP, and they collectively account for about $23b of stock issuance. This represents 5.2% by number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs in our sample.
[ and zero otherwise. Buy Pressure, our main independent variable of interest, is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 through t-4, and zero otherwise. The other independent variables are determinants of the equity issuance decision suggested in the literature, and are described further below. The regressions include industry, year and quarter fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (twodimensional clustering) to control for cross-sectional and time-series correlation (Petersen (2009)).
There are four regression specifications reported in Panel A of Table IV .
Also in Panel A of Table IV , the probability of issuing equity is significantly increasing in the one-year return in all samples, and significantly decreasing in the book-to-market ratio in the IBP sample, which represents a 38% increase in SEO frequency. Overall, Table IV provides support for our main hypothesis that firms time equity issuances to exploit exogenous overvaluation.
B. Timing Insider Sales
If managers identify and exploit price pressure by timing SEOs, we expect them to time their personal sales similarly. This is a powerful test of our hypothesis that mutual fund purchases of stocks we identify as IBP are overvalued and result from funds' restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects, as opposed to the alternative information hypothesis that IBP stock purchases are due to favorable fundamental information about the firm. We expect insiders to sell more shares in the four quarters following IBP if the IBP stock is overvalued (our hypothesis), but not if their firm faces favorable future prospects (the information hypothesis). The hypothesis is tested by estimating regressions of insider sales in quarter t, including an indicator variable for Buy Pressure as defined earlier.
The power of our test to detect timing by managers is potentially limited by the fact that firms frequently restrict insider sales to certain short windows, e.g., within three to twelve days after quarterly earnings announcements (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000)), or require managers to maintain a certain minimum level of holdings. We expect this is unlikely to be an issue because: (a) we examine insider sales over the four quarters following flow-driven buying pressure, not within a narrow window of a few days; and (b) this limitation biases against our ability to reject a null hypothesis of no change in insider sales.
[ is omitted from the regression and so it is the reference or base decile. This result suggests insiders at high growth firms sell relatively more than they purchase compared to insiders at value firms, consistent with exit or diversification needs of insiders at high growth firms.
As in Core et al. (2006) Table V align with those reported in Table   IV , and suggest insiders are able to identify overvaluation and subsequently to time both firmlevel equity issuances and insider sales.
C. Timing Mergers and Acquisitions
Jensen (2005) We test for M&A timing using Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if the firm completed an acquisition in quarter t, and zero otherwise (Harford (1999) Jensen (1986) ).
We also control for size and asset growth over the prior year (e.g., Harford (1999) ). 
IV. Additional Analysis
In this section we conduct a number of sensitivity tests. We summarize the results below and report all tables as well as additional tests in the online appendix.
(i) Our return-matched tests are designed to address the possibility of a non-linear relation between prior year stock returns on the one hand, and SEOs, insider sales, and M&A on the other. We further address the possibility of a non-linear relation using dummies for the first nine return deciles, labeled ret10 to ret 90. For the top return decile, we use percentile dummies labeled ret91 to ret99. Hence, we simultaneously control for ret10, …, ret90, ret91, ….., ret99 in the main regressions and find the results are robust. In particular, the probability of an SEO is 50.5% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.2% higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of a stock-based acquisition is 26.8% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following IBP.
(ii) Our hypotheses contrast IBP stocks with all other stocks. The rest of the stocks include WBP stocks, and we do not separately control for a WBP indicator in our main tests. WBP stocks are subject to widespread mutual fund buying pressure, which potentially reflects favorable information about these firms and their investment opportunities. Thus, it is quite likely that WBP is positively correlated with future SEOs and acquisitions. Such correlation may arise due to the relatively favorable investment opportunities of WBP firms (Table III and Figure 1 suggest that WBP stocks are not overvalued since there is no return reversion after WBP). As an extension of our benchmark specification, we include an indicator variable for WBP. We use this indicator to absorb some of the unexplained variation in the dependent variable across the sample of non-IBP stocks. Results are robust to including an indicator for WBP stocks. In particular, the probability of an SEO is 58.6% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.5% higher (pvalue<0.01) and the probability of a stock-based acquisition is 26.9% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following IBP. In addition, the probability of an SEO is 50% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 5.4%
higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of an acquisition is 22% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following buying pressure.
(iv) We identify IBP firms as those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles of UPressure. Our objective in intersecting with the middle deciles of UPressure is to isolate stocks that are not being widely traded by all other mutual funds. Although symmetry considerations may dictate using the middle quintile of UPressure, we expand our sample of IBP stocks by including three middle deciles. As a robustness check, we replicate our key regressions while intersecting the top decile of Pressure with either the middle two or the middle four UPressure deciles. In both cases we find slightly stronger results. For the case of the middle two deciles of UPressure, we identify 1,523 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative abnormal returns of -12.84% (p-value<0.05) over the six quarters following buying pressure.
Furthermore, the probability of an SEO is 63% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 6.9%
higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of an acquisition is 30% higher (p-value<0.05), in the four quarters following buying pressure. For the case of the middle four deciles of UPressure, we identify 3384 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative abnormal returns of -7.9% (p-value<0.01) over the six quarters following IBP. Furthermore, the probability of an SEO is 59% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.5% higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of an acquisition is 28% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following IBP.
(v) We repeat the insider sale tests under an alternative definition of insiders as the top 5 executives: the CEO, Chairman, President, CFO and COO. Results are robust, with insider sales increasing by 6.6% (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP.
V. Conclusion
Prior literature has examined the price impact of trades by mutual funds with large capital inflows and outflows. We find that stocks subject to buying pressure by mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to widespread buying pressure by other mutual funds, experience substantial upward price impact. Since we use widespread mutual fund buying pressure as an indicator of informed trading, this result suggests that stock prices change in response to uninformed shifts in demand.
Inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure is a relatively exogenous overvaluation identifier for SEO timing studies because it is associated with who is buying -buyers with excess liquidity -rather than with what is being purchased. The price effects of mutual fund buying pressure are sufficiently long-lived to allow managers who are able to identify the overvaluation to time SEOs, insider sales and stock-based acquisitions. We find that in the four quarters following the occurrence of flow-driven buying pressure, the probability of an SEO is 59% higher, insider sales are 7% higher and the probability of completion of a stock-based acquisition is 20% higher. This suggests firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvaluation.
Our evidence of long-lived price impact of uninformed demand shifts, while consistent with empirical evidence in Coval and Stafford (2007) and the arguments of Shleifer (1986), is intriguing. One possible conclusion is that arbitrage was unsuccessful at flattening the demand curve. Reasons for limits to arbitrage include the unavailability of close substitutes, specialization among arbitrageurs combined with a limited number of arbitrageurs, lingering differences in investor opinion about the true value of the stock and short sales constraints.
Alternatively, as Coval and Stafford (2007) point out, market participants may have been unaware of the return pattern induced by mutual fund flows because the relevant data was not available at that time. As we show, despite the data limitations, some firm managers were able to identify overvaluation in the equity of their own firm and react to it by issuing additional shares or selling shares from their personal account. The persistence of the price impact presents one opportunity for future research.
Our findings have a number of additional implications for future research. First, in an international context, smaller markets with fewer close substitutes for individual stocks may experience greater price impact from uninformed shifts in demand, which suggests that the patterns of predictability we identify may be even stronger in such markets. Second, the possibility of persistent stock price dislocation due to uninformed demand shifts has implications for managerial performance evaluation and the optimal sensitivity of managerial compensation to short-run stock returns. Third, from a corporate governance perspective, our findings suggest managers are sometimes better informed than the market and are able to identify market misvaluations, which has implications for the level of discretion they are allowed in responding to price movements through a variety of corporate decisions. Other research opportunities include examining the bond price impact of mutual fund trading pressure and the likelihood of subsequent debt issuances, and examining the effect of mutual fund trading pressure on the use of cash versus stock in corporate acquisitions. Table II reports means for the full sample, for the stocks subject to inflow-driven buying pressure (IBP sample), and for stocks subject to widespread buying pressure by all mutual funds other than funds in the top decile of capital flows (WBP sample). ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. 1-year Return is the stock return over the prior year. BTM is book value of shareholders' equity over market value of equity. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities, over total assets. Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price. Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter. ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year. Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year. Insider Sale is the ratio of shares sold by all insiders to the sum of shares sold and purchased by all insiders in a firm-quarter. Insider Holding is the number of shares held by insiders scaled by total shares outstanding. UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not motivated by capital flows and is intended to capture informationmotivated trading. The middle three deciles of UPressure capture stock quarters that are not subject to widespread net trading in any direction. The last three columns report tests of differences in means between the three samples. Differences in means are calculated each quarter for each pair of samples, and the time series of differences are used for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional correlation. UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not motivated by capital flows and is intended to capture information-motivated trading. The middle three deciles of UPressure capture stock quarters that are not subject to widespread net trading in any direction. Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the equity issuance choice on the independent variables shown. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm has a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets. 1-year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current quarter. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. BTM is book value of shareholders' equity over market value of equity. Leverage is long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities, over total assets. Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter. ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year. Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year. Panel A reports coefficients from regressions of insider sales (Insider Sale) in quarter t on the independent variables shown. Insider Sale is the ratio of shares sold by insiders in a firm-quarter to the sum of shares sold and purchased by insiders in that firm-quarter. Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 1-year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current quarter. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter. ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year. BTM is book value of shareholders' equity over market value of equity, at the end of the same quarter in the prior year. BTM is ranked into deciles from BTM1 (low BTM) to BTM10 (high BTM). The BTM10 dummy is omitted. Insider Holding is the number of shares held by insiders scaled by total shares outstanding. The second column shows results for the full sample. The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching variables are indicated at the top of the column. Once the matched sample is obtained, a regression is estimated with dependent and independent variables as described above. Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the acquisition choice on the independent variables shown. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm engages in a stock-based acquisition in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4. 1-year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current quarter. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. BTM is book value of shareholders' equity over market value of equity. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets. Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter. ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year. Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year. The second column shows results for the full sample. The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching variables are indicated at the top of the column. Once the matched sample is obtained, a Logit regression is estimated with dependent and independent variables as described above. Standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), and the samples span 1990 through 2007. *** ( ** ) [ * ] represents one-tailed statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%] . Panel B reports acquisition frequencies in all three matched samples. In Panel B, M&A=1 for stock-quarters with an acquisition, and 0 otherwise, while IBP=1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and 0 otherwise. IBP is described in the notes to 
